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28 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

Via:

CSR/2

SUBJECT : Plan for AEBASIN/REDSOX Spring 1954 Operation

1. General

In accordance with the provisions of Project AEBASIN, as approved, the plan outlined below for an operation for Spring 1954 is herewith offered for consideration and approval. Basically, the operation will consist of dispatching two Estonian agents to the Estonian SSR for the purpose of procuring intelligence.

2. Objectives

a. Mission

- (1) The two agents to be dispatched to the Estonian SSR will be given the mission of locating, assessing, recruiting, and briefing a number of qualified and useful legal residents for the purpose of having them communicate with us and furnish us intelligence on a long-term basis.
- (2) The agents to be dispatched will cover such targets as can be examined by observation. Targets of opportunity will be covered as circumstances permit.
- (3) Having accomplished the above, the agents will then attempt to exfiltrate, along with a knowledgeable, legal resident whom we could debrief, train and return within the shortest possible period of time.

b. Tasks

The agents will be furnished a number of prospective contacts for support, as well as possible recruitment; in addition, they themselves have several close relatives in Estonia who could possibly be utilized for such a purpose. These individuals are located in the general area of PARNU, TALLINN, and TARTU. Should it become feasible for one or both agents to assume a semblance of legal status and remain in Estonia for an extended period of time, they will do so with the plan that one of them, accompanied by a legally-living resident, will endeavor to exfiltrate in 1955.

c. Targets

(1) Specific Requirements

- (a) Warning of Soviet offensive or defensive preparedness:

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- 1) Trends in active or passive air-defense readiness
- 2) Intensification of conscription
- 3) Mass deportation of the population from coastal areas and from the Islands.
- 4) Intensified troop movements into the area.

(b) TALLINN, City of

- 1) Naval Base and Shipyard "Morskoy Zavod"
- 2) Shipyard "Kopli" #840
- 3) TALLINN Airfield at LASNAMAEE--number and type of aircraft using the field; length, direction, and surfacing of runways; location of radio and radar stations; location and type of anti-aircraft defenses; location and type of fuel storage.
- 4) Movement of naval and merchant shipping.

(c) PALDISKI Port Area

- 1) Activities inside the PALDISKI City and port areas
- 2) Activities, type of aircraft using the fields, length, direction and surfacing of runways, location and type of anti-aircraft defenses at the airfields of:

KLOOGA
LAOKULA
LEETSE
VASALEMMA.

(2) General Requirements

- (a) 1) Trends in basic economic policy, as to availability or disappearance of consumers' goods.
- 2) Railroad operations, type of transport, construction, intensity of traffic.
- 3) Intensification of travel and housing controls.
- 4) Changes in documentation and security controls.
- 5) Partisan activities and resistance movement.
- 6) Deforestation of areas.
- 7) Railroad timetables for major cities.

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(b) TALLINN, City of

- 1) Port facilities and controls
- 2) Accessibility to and from the port area
- 3) Police control in the area of PIRITA beach, as to restrictions of movement on the shore and in the water
- 4) Political administration of the city
- 5) Composition of the population in the city as to Estonians, Russians, military and civilian.

3. Personnel

- a. Two agents, AETAXI and RNCHANGE, are being trained by SR/DOB. The following is a brief biography of each:

- (1) AETAXI was born on a farm in the Parnu District of Estonia on 16 March 1924. In grade school he was a good student and graduated cum laude. He then went to the Parnu Progymnasium intending to become a teacher. His main interests, however, were mainly mechanical. In 1939, he left the Parnu Progymnasium and enrolled in the Iron and Electrical Department of the Trade School in Tallinn. In May 1941, the Soviet Union transferred the school and students to Leningrad, where, as part of trade training, AETAXI worked as a glass cutter's apprentice. In June 1941, he was transferred with other Estonians to Kiev for military training, after which he was sent to the Eastern Front. Not wanting to fight for Communism, he surrendered to the Germans in August 1941, and subsequently escaped. He returned to Estonia and enlisted in a German-sponsored Estonian Battalion and served throughout the war, receiving several wounds. When AETAXI saw that Estonia was being over-run by the Communists and that his unit was to be evacuated to Germany, he deserted and escaped to Sweden in September 1944. In Sweden, he has worked as an electrician and steel worker. He contemplated, on several occasions, to return to Estonia as an agent but failed to develop the necessary contacts.
- (2) RNCHANGE. The agent was born in Sindi, Estonia, on 26 January 1921. His schooling, after the completion of two years of high school, ended in 1940. He was expelled from the high school because of his refusal to sing the "internationale" when forced to attend the Communist school meetings. From July 1941 to September 1944, he served in an Estonian battalion, fighting against the Soviet forces inside and outside of the Estonian boundaries. He participated in many battles on the Soviet front and attained the rank of a platoon leader. When his unit was badly beaten by the Soviet forces, he made his

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way to Sweden in September 1944, and has worked as a laborer in lumber camps, as a driver for an electrical appliance factory, and as a laboratory assistant for A/S Goodyear, where he worked until his departure from Sweden to the U.S.

b. The following is a brief and condensed assessment of each agent:

(1) AETAXI

AETAXI is an average person with the usual amount of stubbornness, emotional flare-up, sentiment, and humor. He is more of an extrovert than his partner, and usually has little difficulty in getting along with people. His outstanding weakness is his lack of conviction; as a result, he is fairly easily swayed by others and can be led without much difficulty. As far as ability to perform operationally is concerned, he does possess a substantial amount of clandestine sense; he is a good soldier; he knows what is at stake when he embarks on this operation and appears to be prepared to face all it entails. This last point needs elaboration: It is very doubtful whether or not AETAXI will proceed on a mission alone; he is definitely a "team" man and needs someone to lean upon. This does not, however, mean that he would admit defeat if he were to lose his partner or that he would fail in an attempt to perform some task because his partner or partners were not with him. It does, however, indicate that he definitely needs someone or something--even an imaginary person or thing--to lean upon mentally, emotionally, and psychologically. Full consideration, however, is given to the fact that the psychiatric assessment given to this agent by the DOB Medical Office strongly advises that the agent is emotionally not suited for operational utilization. However, the Assessment and Evaluation Staff of CIA/TR found him suitable for the task.

(2) RNCHANGE

As a man, this agent presents more handling problems than his partner. He is sullen, stubborn, often rebellious as far as taking orders is concerned, and a definite introvert. Being self-centered, he will be fairly intolerant with persons who do not agree with his ideas. Yet he does have some admirable traits: He is exceedingly honest, dependable, and pays extreme attention to detail, which, unfortunately, often causes him to lose sight of the over-all scope of things. He has apparently had little affection given to him which has resulted in a keen interest in helpless creatures to a point where such interest almost becomes an obsession. Basically, he is a good soldier and will always be able to shift for himself. He is determined to avail himself of every opportunity--no matter how slight--to kill himself if he is to be apprehended. Although he would, no doubt, be able to withstand a good deal of torture prior to breaking, this ability is greatly minimized by the psychological effect of the erroneous belief that he cannot withstand torture.

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On the whole, it must be noted that the agents are of the average type and possess no outstanding qualifications either in general or in any one particular field. Whether or not they will be able to perform the difficult tasks expected of them can only be evaluated toward the latter part of their training when their capability of performing and employing the subjects learned will be tested in practical exercises.

4. Mode of Dispatch and Drop Zone

a. Mode of Dispatch

(1) Sea Infiltration:

At the present time, discussions are being held with appropriate Agency components in order to determine the facility of this means of dispatch. The TIEBARS have been requested to assist us in such sea infiltration. It is hoped that definite decision in this respect will be made prior to 1 January 1954.

(2) Balloon Dispatch:

There is a possibility of dispatch by balloon from GOTLAND. This, however, is still in the discussion stage and will be considered when all pertinent points have crystallized. Equipment for this mode of dispatch is available and can be procured on a priority basis.

(3) Air Dispatch:

The Air Section has been queried as to their accepting a requirement of air dispatch to a given area in Estonia and has replied in the affirmative. CSOB has been informed of this possible dispatch requirement.

b. Drop Zone

- (1) Should the dispatch be by sea, the agents may be landed on the Estonian coast bordering the Gulf of Finland, approximately 20 miles East of TALLINN. The exact landing point and approach to it will be worked out in cooperation with the TIEBARS.
- (2) Should the dispatch be by air (balloon or plane), the DZ area will be in a forested, swampy, unpopulated area half-way between the Estonian cities of PARNU and VILIJANDI in the southwestern part of Estonia.

Map coverage (scale 1:50,000) is available and will be utilized for detailed operational planning. A request has been made to Graphics Registry to furnish all available aerial photo coverage on the drop or landing zone and the immediate vicinity. Upon detailed study and perusal of the above-mentioned aerial photographs, a definite pin-point drop or landing zone will be chosen and the information conveyed to the appropriate authority.

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5. Envisioned Operational Situation

a. Movement

(1) In the case of balloon infiltration:

Immediately subsequent to the drop, the agents will locate a suitable caching place for the landing gear and bury it as soon after landing as possible. For this purpose, they will select a swampy spot where digging is easier and disposal of the earth facilitated by the surrounding water.

With their equipment, the agents will proceed into a thick forest from the landing zone during the remaining period of darkness. During their march to the forest, the agents will continue to wear their jump suits over their clothes. When the agents have reached the forest and have found sufficient cover to hide for the remainder of the night and the early part of the day, they will locate a suitable cache and bury their equipment and W/T set, retaining S/W facilities, some chocolate bars, personal effects, documents, and pistols, with silencers if appropriate ones are available.

During the early hours of daylight, the agents will describe the cache in their S/W letter and prepare the letter for mailing. If the agents feel secure, they can leave the cache area for a better location for further rest and observation of the countryside. As soon as the sun begins to set, they will proceed in the direction of the town of SINDI, which is about 30 km northwest of the landing area. They will observe the SINDI railroad station to determine whether or not sufficient life and movement exist so that they may unobtrusively purchase railroad tickets. If the agents find that the purchase of tickets can be made, they will procure tickets individually while remaining in sight of another agent for TALLINN, a distance of about 150 km away. Should the railroad station appear deserted or otherwise insecure, they will proceed to walk toward the town of TORI, about 14 km northeast of SINDI, and attempt to board a train there. This process will continue until they have found a secure station for boarding a train to TALLINN. The agents will travel separately in the car but within the sight of each other. Upon their arrival in TALLINN, the agents will mail their S/W letters prepared for prearranged mail drops.

(2) In the case of aircraft drop:

Subsequent to the drop from the airplane, the agents will bury their traveling gear immediately, and leave the DZ area for a more forested area with their equipment on their backs.

During their march to the forest, the agents will continue to wear their jump suits over their clothes. When the agents feel secure, they will locate a suitable place for cache, describe

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the cache in their individual S/W letter, prepare the letter for mailing, and bury their equipment and jump suits, most of the money, retaining part of the S/W equipment and some chocolate bars, plus personal items.

After performing these tasks, the agents, avoiding highways and villages, will march in the direction of a sizeable town on the MOISAKULA-VILJANDI railroad line until daylight interrupts their march. At the dawn, they will bed down for the day and will establish their approximate location, and make plans for the entering of the town proper during the following night. As soon as twilight disappears, they will proceed to enter the town proper where they will observe the railroad station for the purpose of determining whether or not sufficient life or movement exists for an unobtrusive purchase of railroad tickets.

Should the railroad station appear deserted or otherwise unsuitable, they will proceed to walk to the next station and attempt to board a train there for TALLINN (approximately 175 km away). This process will continue until they have found a secure station for boarding a train.

Course will be in East-Northeast direction of HALLISTE, LOODI, SINIALLIKU Stations.

- (3) In the event of an air drop, the agents will land from 30 to 40 km distance from the railroad stations. Therefore, it will take the agents about 10 hours' march to the stations for boarding of TALLINN-bound trains. Considering that the nights at the dispatch time are about 8 hours long, the marching time left for the agents would be, at the most, about 3 hours during the first night, and the distance covered in that time could be about 15 km, leaving a distance of 15 to 25 km for the next night's walk. Since the time to begin a march would be at about 2100 hours, the agents would reach a suitable station on or about 2400 or 0200 hours respectively. The 175 km travel on the narrow-gauge railroad would take between 6 to 9 hours, depending upon the type of train, whether it is an "express" or regular mixed passenger and freight train. Thus, the agents are likely to arrive at TALLINN anywhere between 0600 and 1200 hours, provided they will be lucky to catch a night train.

Upon the arrival at TALLINN, the agents will proceed to enter the city proper, drop their prepared S/W letters into two separate mail boxes and make preparations for their initial contact with AETAXI's relative. The length of the agents' stay in TALLINN will depend upon the arrangements with this contact.

b. Contacts

- (1) There are five types of contacts under consideration to which

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the agents may avail themselves:

- (a) Relatives and friends of RNCHANGE and AETAXI in PARNU-TALLINN area.
- (b) TIRESOME's network of contacts in the area.
- (c) Contacts which may be furnished by CANDIDO by 1 January 1954, as per instruction for the procurement of such information through debriefing of latest possible repatriates from Estonia.
- (d) Contacts which will become available to the Estonian Desk of SR/2 from various knowledgeable sources, such as recent defectors and exfiltrates from the Estonian SSR and now in the Western world.
- (e) Relatives and friends of Estonian refugees still living in the Estonian SSR which have become available to the Estonian Desk.

Final selection of contacts will be submitted at a later date.

(2) Initial Contact at TALLINN

At TALLINN, AETAXI has a half-brother working for the PARNU-TALLINN railroad system, whose last address is known to AETAXI up to 1946. AETAXI feels that his half-brother has a strong attachment to the agent. Attempts will be made to find the latest address of this half-brother in TALLINN, if he is still alive. If this address cannot be ascertained prior to dispatch, AETAXI would have to locate his half-brother while in TALLINN. Sometime during the morning hours, AETAXI should have a meeting place selected before calling up his contact. Under no circumstances will the agent give his identity to his contact. AETAXI will call the Administration Building of the railroad by telephone (information) and inquire whether his contact could be reached at the institution. If he makes a contact with the half-brother, the agent should merely tell him that he comes from PARNU, and has some news from the village of TAHKURANNA, which he would like to relay to him after work. The agents will spend the remainder of the day sightseeing under the cover that he is waiting for friends to finish work before he can visit them. He will use his regular cover in TALLINN (he just arrived from PARNU on leave).

When the time for the meeting with the contact approaches, AETAXI will appear at the meeting place at least 10 minutes before the appointed time and re-examine the place for an emergency exit and for the exact spot at which the contact will be met. AETAXI will have to consider the possibility that the contact will show great surprise and may shout out his name.

On meeting the contact, AETAXI will brief him at the earliest opportunity that he is on leave from the PARNU Fishing Kolkhoz. Since the agent's contact is knowledgeable of AETAXI's absence from Estonia, this story will only seem to answer the curiosity of his contact's friends, should such a need arise. AETAXI will inform the contact in confidence that he had escaped from an Arctic area prison camp, and, therefore, has difficulties in establishing himself legally. So far, the agent has been living by stealing and black-marketeering and has been moving from place to place. However, the agent does not want to jeopardize his contact by requesting shelter in his apartment, but would like to have his advice as to how and where he could live for a few days without drawing the attention of the militia or its informants. Furthermore, the agent will ask the contact about the addresses of relatives still living at TAHKURANNA, about their attitudes and positions in the area.

If the contact is in a position to provide the agent with a place to stay in the TALLINN area, the agent will arrange for a next meeting time and place, depending upon the location where the agents will be able to stay.

In the event that the contact appears to be willing to cooperate, AETAXI should part with the contact, meet RNCHANGE as per a previous arrangement, and spend the night according to the suggestion of the contact. The length of time the agents will spend in the TALLINN area will depend upon the amount of operational support the contact is willing to provide in terms of lodging and operational information. In the event that the contact is unwilling or unable to cooperate, the agents should leave the TALLINN area as soon as possible by train to PARNU and begin their activity by first surveying the TAHKURANNA-SINDI areas where both of the agents have several other relatives living in the agrarian villages. During the surveying period, the agents will operate from their hideouts, in a swampy forest, until they find one apparently secure contact in the area who could be recruited as a support and contact agent.

The preliminary assignment of the contact will be to find the exact addresses of individuals in Estonia whose names are known to the Estonian Desk, who may be willing to cooperate or become agents, but whose more recent addresses are unknown. One of these individuals is known to be living in TALLINN. He used to be a ham radio operator and has relatives in the U.S. Another such person is living in TARTU, and is believed to be a physical education instructor at the TARTU University. This individual also has anti-Communist relatives living in the U.S.

In the event that TIRESOME can provide more definite secure contacts for the use of AEBASIN agents, recognition signals and procedures for contacting will be worked out in accordance with the required situation.

c. Control and Compromise Indicators

- (1) W/T. Control and compromise indicators for this means of communication will consist of a fixed text phrase whose position will change when the agent is challenged. The challenge as well as one give-away, one alternate and one key control signals will be of the synonym type.

RNCHANGE will also use a fixed text in the form of spelling out the word "dash" rather than transmitting the standard symbol (-). AETAXI will use a variant of this in the form of writing out the word "period" rather than transmitting the symbol for this word (.). In addition, the agents will have a cryptographic control and compromise indicator which will be assigned by Commo.

- (2) S/W. All of the above (W/T) control and compromise indicators apply to S/W. However, in addition to these, the agents will also be given certain styling and location of salutary and complementary phrases as control and compromise indicators.
- (3) For the purpose of S/W, two letter drops (one for each agent) will be established in Germany, Sweden, the U.S., and another WE Division area whose [] is able to provide and service a letter drop. Although a good deal of uncertainty exists as to whether or not an external letter can be mailed in Estonia without difficulty, it is believed that the same rules and regulations exist in Estonia as in Latvia. However, should this not be the case, the agents can travel unhampered from Estonia to either a major city in Latvia or the capitol and mail the S/W letters from there.

d. Exfiltration

The following are alternatives for possible exfiltration which will be given to the agents prior to their dispatch:

- (1) By overland route through LENINGRAD to FINLAND or NORWAY.
- (2) By water from the RIGA GULF-PARNU area to GOTLAND, Sweden.
- (3) By water from the TALLINN-KUNDA area of the Estonian SSR to Finland.

Additional details on the exfiltration routes are not available at the present time but should become available through exfiltrees and through the agents' own on-the-spot investigation. Other suitable routes and methods, if available, will be communicated to the agents after dispatch.

6. Documentation and Legends

It is planned to document both agents as persons who were taken along

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with the Russian forces when they retreated from Estonia in 1941. Both agents will have served in the Russian Army during the war and will have been discharged and returned to Estonia in 1946, where they were supposedly issued a new set of documents in 1951, based on their original document issue in the LENINGRAD-PEDVOZAVODSK areas in 1946. Of necessity, one of the agents will have had to serve in the Russian forces in the capacity of "limited service" because of having only one eye. The agents' legends will follow a pattern of their actual legends up to 1941, with a change of names, dates, and places. Subsequent to 1941, their legends will follow the pattern of AENOTE, one of the indigenous instructors of the AEBASIN Project, who had similar experiences in actual life as those the agents will utilize in their legends and their documentation. The agents will most probably carry two or three sets of documents under different names which will provide them sufficient lee-way for maneuvering in case the name of one passport is compromised.

7. Communications

The primary means of communication for the two agents to be dispatched will be S/W. Any personnel they may recruit for agent work among the legally-living people in Estonia will also utilize S/W as a primary means of communication. The alternate means of communication will be W/T, which will also be utilized as an emergency means of maintaining contact when speed is essential and in the event that S/W channels should be cut off. Should the agents have no need for W/T communications, or should they be unable to recruit a W/T operator with whom they may leave the W/T set, and should they be able to exfiltrate in the fall of 1954, the set will remain in Estonia for future use. Messages to the agents will be in the form of blind W/T broadcasts. For this purpose, each agent will take with him an RS-5 receiver.

8. Support

- a. The usual array of agent equipment and clothing for normal clandestine work in a denied area will be required. The need for specialized electronic and other similar gear is not envisioned at the present time. Depending upon the advice of Commo, the agents will take along either the RS-1 or the RS-6; further equipment to be drawn from Commo will be the URK-4. Appropriate clothing and trivial personal items of Estonia or Russian origin for authentication purposes, as well as items for concealment, will be procured from TSS. All of the above will be sterilized as far as is possible.
- b. Based on the assumption that a set of forged documents costs 10,000 rubles and the estimate that an agent needs 10,000 rubles in order to exist in the Baltic area for one year, it is felt desirable that each of the agents should carry 25,000 rubles. Any currency that is left over immediately prior to exfiltration will be left for the remaining agent or--if both exfiltrate--for any recruited legal resident.

9. Security

Although at the present time--and since the agents entered training in the U.S.--the security of this operation seems well in hand, there is some doubt regarding the security aspect in the country in which the agents were recruited--Sweden. This basically stems from a prolonged period of time between the original contact and the actual recruitment, as well as the fact that RNCHANGE was originally proposed as an action agent by a political leader. An added security implication is AEPALM, who has since been disposed of but who was originally recruited in the same manner in Sweden, and who actually began training as a member of this training unit. There seems to be little, if any, security consideration subsequent to the agents' dispatch. Neither of the agents corresponds with anyone at the present time, although RNCHANGE does have a sister in the U.S.

10. Timetable

It is planned that the agents will complete their training by 17 April; that they will undergo final briefing and staging from that date until approximately 27-30 April. They will arrive in Germany on or about the 2nd of May. A final check and final instructions will be given from that date until approximately the 8th of May, and they will be dispatched from Germany (in case of dispatch by air) sometime prior to the 15th of May. Should sea or balloon dispatch from Sweden be the mode of dispatch for this team, the agents will be moved from Germany to Sweden on or about 8 May and be dispatched from Sweden prior to 15 May 1954.

Appendix:

List of Potential Contacts

List of S/W Mail Drops

TRANSMITTAL SLIP			
TO:		DEC 22 1953 (Date)	
BUILDING	SR/COF	ROOM NO.	2040
REMARKS:			
<p><i>The two appendices will be submitted to your office at a later date. They are in the process of completion at the present time.</i></p>			
FROM:			
BUILDING	J	ROOM NO.	2508
		EXTENSION	3264
FORM NO. 36-8		10-65288-1 GPO	
SEP 1946			